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ABSTRACT: The legal status of binding and non-binding international decisions adopted by global 
regulatory bodies in EU law, their authority (as acknowledged in the case law of the CJEU) and legal 
effects allow one to characterise them as the external administrative layer of EU law-making. 
Mega-regional agreements, of which the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) is 
an instance, have the potential to expand this tier of law. This Article maps the substantive legal 
effects of international decisions in EU law as expounded by the CJEU, arguing that the case law 
the Court developed is transposable to future decisions of CETA bodies. Furthermore, it contrasts 
their possible substantive impact in EU law with the weaknesses of procedural controls over the 
exercise of public authority by those bodies. 
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I. The international regulation of public goods: legal challenges 
The negotiations of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)1 and the 
ratification of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)2 provoked 
heated academic and public discussions throughout 2016. While largely focused on in-
vestor-state dispute settlement, they placed the spotlight on an important reality in the 
practice of EU external relations. Decisions adopted at the international level define 
substantive aspects of domestic law (including EU regulation concerning the provision 
of public goods, such as health and the safety of pharmaceuticals, chemicals, food 
products, environmental protection and financial stability).3 Whether adopted by inter-
national bodies set up to implement international agreements binding on the EU – as is 
now the case of CETA4 – or adopted outside the framework of an international agree-
ment in informal regulatory fora (composed of EU administrative bodies and other 
global actors), international decisions may have important substantive legal effects. As 
the Court of Justice has explicitly acknowledged, even non-binding decisions of an in-
ternational body “are capable of decisively influencing the content of [EU] legislation” 
and, thereby, may have a “direct impact on the European Union’s acquis”.5 
 
1 Initiated by EU directives ST 11103/13 for the negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Invest-
ment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and the US, unanimously adopted by the Council on 14 June 
2013 and declassified and made public by the Council on 9 October 2014 (for the current state of negotia-
tion see trade.ec.europa.eu). 
2 Council document n°10973/16, "Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada, 
of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part", dated 14th Septem-
ber 2016. 
3 The term “decisions” is adopted here in a broad sense, to refer to acts that can have legal effects in 
the sense of Art. 218, para. 9, TFEU, as established in Court of Justice, judgment of 7 October 2014, case 
C-399/12, Federal Republic of Germany v. Council of the European Union [GC], irrespective of the scope of 
their addressees. Unless otherwise specified, it encompasses formally non-binding acts, such as guide-
lines, recommendations, best practices, standards. It does not include decisions of a judicial or a dispute 
settlement body, given their specific procedure and function as resulting from a dispute arbitrated by an 
impartial body (on these, see P.-J. KUIJPER, J. WOUTERS, F. HOFFMEISTER, G. DE BAERE, T. RAMOPOULOS, The Law of 
EU External Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 721-726). 
4 At the time of the writing, the European Parliament had given its consent to the conclusion of the 
agreement (European Parliament Legislative Resolution of 15 February 2017 on the Draft Council Deci-
sion on the Conclusion of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, 
of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part (10975/2016 – C8-
0438/2016 – 2016/0205(NLE)) and the Canadian Senate had approved the implementing act required un-
der national law, available at www.parl.ca, thus triggering the possible provisional application of the 
agreement under Article 30.7, para. 3, CETA. The text of the agreement is available at da-
ta.consilium.europa.eu. 
5 Federal Republic of Germany v. Council of the European Union [GC], cit., paras 63 and 64. At stake in 
this case were recommendations of a body set up by an international agreement to which the EU is not a 
party (21 Member States are) but in which it is a “guest” in the terms of that body’s internal rules and 
whose meetings the Commission attends (Federal Republic of Germany v. Council of the European Union 
[GC], cit., para. 5). 
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International regulation of public goods is a reality that global markets cannot do 
without. Yet, it is also a reality that reinforces the law-making role of executive and ad-
ministrative bodies while at the same time posing important challenges to law’s ability 
to constrain their authority.6 By now, a plethora of bilateral and multilateral conven-
tions set up regulatory regimes and bodies that adopt decisions, resolutions, recom-
mendations, guidelines, best practices in a variety of policy fields. Mega-regional 
agreements, due to their scope and aims, give a distinct significance to this phenome-
non and emphasise its legal challenges.7 As the name of the first mega-regional agree-
ment approved by the European Parliament indicates, these are “comprehensive eco-
nomic and trade” agreements touching virtually every relevant economic sector. Estab-
lished between two parties that already apply feeble tariff barriers to bilateral trade – 
the EU and its Member States and Canada (the Parties) – CETA aims mainly at: eliminat-
ing non-tariff barriers; ensuring better access to public procurement; protecting in-
vestment, intellectual property (including pharmaceutical patents) and geographical in-
dications; warranting that food safety, animal and plant health regulations do not cre-
ate unjustified barriers to trade; facilitating the provision of services (including financial 
and telecommunication services); recognising professional qualifications; protecting the 
security and integrity of both Parties’ financial systems as insurance and banking ser-
vices are provided cross-border; regulating the maritime transport market; ensuring 
cooperation between their respective competition authorities; safeguarding conserva-
tion and sustainable management of forests and fisheries; preventing either side from 
ignoring or lowering environmental and labour standards to boost trade.8 CETA, in ad-
dition, establishes a set of committees whose function is to implement the agreement. 
Some of these committees have the capacity to adapt to evolving realities the substan-
tive commitments that the Parties assumed when signing and ratifying the agreement, 
in a way that enables the agreement to continue fulfilling its purposes.  
Addressing the international regulation of public goods from the perspective of the 
EU, this Article characterises the ensuing international decisions as the external adminis-
 
6 Specifically on this argument, see, J. MENDES: Rule of Law and Participation: A Normative Analysis of In-
ternationalised Rulemaking as Composite Procedures?, in International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2014, p. 
370 et seq.; Participation in a New Regulatory Paradigm: Collaboration and Constraint in TTIP's Regulatory Co-
operation, in IILJ/NYU Working Paper MegaReg Series 2016/5. 
7 On mega-regional trade agreements, see R.T. BULL, N.A. MAHBOUBI, R.B. STEWART, J.B. WIENER, New 
approaches to international regulatory cooperation: the challenge of TTIP, TPP and mega-regional trade 
agreements, in Law and Contemporary Problems, 2015, p. 1 et seq. On the constitutional challenges that 
they pose, see E.-U. PETERSMANN, Transformative Transatlantic Free Trade Agreements without Rights and 
Remedies of Citizens?, in Journal of European International Economic Law, 2015, p. 579 et seq. 
8 Art. 30.10, para. 4, CETA. Analysing the changes in EU trade policy and the new generation of trade 
agreements, and thus placing CETA in its broader context, see A.S. SERRANO, From External Policy to Free Trade: 
The EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement in P. EECKHOUT, M. LOPEZ-ESCUDERO (eds), The European Union's external 
action in times of crisis, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016, pp. 483-507, in particular pp. 487-491. 
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trative layer of EU law, given their legal status, authority and substantive legal effects in EU 
law. In addition, it points out the disconnect between these effects and the weak proce-
dural rules that frame their adoption. It focuses on decisions by CETA bodies: because of 
the scope of this agreement, these have the potential to expand the external administra-
tive layer of EU law. While it is at present not possible to assess the substantive effects of 
these decisions – at the time of writing the agreement is only being provisionally applied – 
the authority the CJEU has thus far attributed to, and the effects it has recognised regard-
ing, international decisions could apply to those future decisions. In fact, the reasons that 
have led the CJEU to tease out the legal effects of decisions of international bodies, while 
at the same time justifying their authority in EU law, are arguably transposable to the fu-
ture decisions of CETA bodies. Section II starts by highlighting the instances in which CETA 
bodies can adopt international decisions and recommendations to implement the agree-
ment, even if acknowledging that formal decision-making is a small portion of their regu-
latory activity. Section III explains the formal legal status of decisions of international bod-
ies in EU law. In doing so, it also considers decisions adopted to implement multilateral 
agreements, given the relevance of the respective case law for this discussion. Section IV 
examines the substantive effects and authority of international decisions through the lens 
of the case law of the Court of Justice.9 Section V returns to CETA and points out the pro-
cedural weaknesses of implementing decision-making as established by this agreement, 
which contrast with the status, authority and substantive legal effects of international de-
cisions in EU law. Section VI examines the role of Art. 218, para. 9, TFEU in addressing the 
normative concerns raised by these procedural weaknesses. Section VII concludes arguing 
that, while CETA bodies can in practice make EU law, their authority in adopting such deci-
sions may be virtually unrestrained. 
II. International decisions by CETA bodies  
The interactions between international and EU regulatory bodies are multifaceted and 
often do not fit in the vertical scheme by which decisions adopted by international bod-
ies are incorporated in domestic legal orders.10 By focusing on this type of interaction, 
the Article leaves in the shadow a multitude of softer, but not less influential, forms of 
public action that may equally influence the EU legal order. With regard to regulatory 
cooperation in the framework of mega-regional agreements, for instance, it has been 
pointed out that decisions, whether formal or informal, are possibly the least likely out-
 
9 Authority is understood here in the sense proposed by Armin von Bogdandy and others as the abil-
ity to affect the freedom of others in pursuance of a public interest (see, most recently, A. VON BOGDANDY, 
M. GOLDMANN, I. VENZKE, From Public International to International Public Law: Translating World Public Opin-
ion into International Public Authority, in European Journal of International Law, 2017, p. 115 et seq.). 
10 R.B. STEWART, The Global Regulatory Challenge to U.S. Administrative Law, in NYU Journal of Interna-
tional Law and Politics, 2005, p. 703. 
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come of the activities performed under an international agreement.11 Indeed, regulato-
ry cooperation under CETA entails a whole range of procedural obligations of the Par-
ties regarding the “development, review and methodological aspects” of their regulatory 
measures.12 Engaging in regulatory cooperation may mean only discussing regulatory 
reform, “lessons learned”, “exchange experiences”, mutually consulting on regulatory 
developments, sharing information, examining and comparing assumptions and meth-
odologies of data analysis or post-implementation reviews.13 The list of regulatory co-
operation activities shows the multitude of tasks involved in regulation that extend to 
international regulation and structure decision-making in ways that are often outside of 
the lawyers’ radar.  
As important as it may be to analyse that transatlantic structure of regulation, it 
should not detract from the more conventional legal powers that may be involved in 
implementing international agreements, in particular – given their wide scope – in the 
case of mega-regional agreements. As specified in CETA, regulatory cooperation also 
entails examining the opportunities to achieve regulatory convergence (“minimise un-
necessary divergences”) via, inter alia, “achieving a harmonised, equivalent or compati-
ble solution” or “considering mutual recognition in specific cases”.14 To the extent that 
regulatory cooperation may ultimately lead to formal recommendations, these will be 
adopted either by the CETA Joint Committee (hereinafter, Joint Committee), possibly by 
suggestion of the Regulatory Cooperation Forum;15 or directly by the Regulatory Coop-
eration Forum, a specialized committee to which the Joint Committee may delegate its 
powers.16 Other CETA specialized committees have decision-making powers: the Joint 
 
11 R.T. BULL, N.A. MAHBOUBI, R.B. STEWART, J.B. WIENER, New Approaches to International Regulatory Coop-
eration, cit., pp. 10-12. 
12 Art. 21.1, CETA. 
13 Ibid., Art. 21.4. 
14 Ibid., Art. 21.4, let. g), ii) and iii). 
15 Ibid., Arts 21.6, para. 4, let. c), and 26.2, para. 6. The Regulatory Cooperation Forum needs to report to 
the Joint Committee “as appropriate” and “on the results and consultations from each meeting”. The chapter 
on regulatory cooperation does not give the Forum the power to decide or issue recommendations (Art. 
21.6, and see also Art. 26.2, let. h)). The Joint Committee, on the contrary, may take decisions “in respect of all 
matters when this Agreement so provides” (Art. 26.3, para. 1) and “make appropriate recommendations” 
(Art. 26.3, para. 2). From the combination of these provisions, it results that decisions are most likely not 
permissible regarding regulatory cooperation (following Art. 26.3, para. 1, that power would need to be spec-
ified in the Agreement). Art. 26.2. para. 4, raises a doubt in this respect: it enables specialised committees to 
propose draft decisions for adoption by the Joint Committee, but presumably only where the latter’s power 
to take decisions is specified in the Treaty (see e.g. Arts 2.13, para. 2, and 8.10, para. 3, the regulatory coop-
eration chapter does not have similar provisions). 
16 Ibid., Art. 26.1, para. 5, let. a), which mentions the delegation of “responsibilities”. If the interpreta-
tion in the footnote 15 holds, the Joint Committee could only delegate the power to adopt recommenda-
tions as it would not have the power to adopt decisions in the field of regulatory cooperation. It is note-
worthy that despite the reference in an official information site that the Regulatory Cooperation Forum 
does not have formal decision-making powers (Ministère de l’Économie, Accord économique et commercial 
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Management Committee for Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures may decide to 
amend the annexes to the chapter on Sanitary and Phytosanitary; the Committee on 
Services and Investment may develop recommendations regarding a possible revision 
of the obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment, submit them to the Joint 
Committee for decision; it may make recommendations on the interpretation of CETA 
(that may eventually be binding via a decision of the Joint Committee) and recommen-
dations on the functioning of the Appellate Tribunal; the Financial Services Committee 
has the power to adopt decisions and is involved in the arbitration of financial disputes; 
and the Committee on Geographical Indications may recommend that the Joint Com-
mittee add or remove geographical indications from the respective CETA Annex.17 
Moreover, any decisions by the Joint Committee will be followed up by the CETA contact 
points, who monitor and ensure the continuity of the work of the CETA bodies.18  
There are relatively few indications regarding the composition of these bodies. The 
Joint Committee comprises “representatives” of the EU (including of its Member States, 
given that this is a mixed agreement) and of Canada, being chaired by the Canadian 
Minister for International Trade and the Commission’s Trade commissioner.19 Special-
ised committees mostly gather regulatory representatives from each party; when they 
meet, “all the competent authorities for each issue on the agenda” must be represented 
to ensure an “adequate level of expertise”.20 This means that the EU agencies, together 
with their Canadian and EU Member States counterparts, are likely to be involved in 
these specialised committees. For example, the Regulatory Cooperation Forum is com-
posed of “relevant officials” of each Party, who by mutual consent may invite “other in-
terested parties to participate” in their meetings; its chairs will be representatives of the 
Canadian government and of the Commission.21  
The Joint Committee has a considerably broad mandate, within the scope of which 
it “shall” take decisions, when the agreement so provides, and may adopt recommenda-
tions.22 That mandate includes: the duty to consider “any matter of interest related to an 
area covered by [CETA]”; the possibility to “study the development of trade between the 
Parties and consider ways to further enhance trade relations between the Parties”; the 
 
global (AECG – en anglais CETA: Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement) entre l’Union européenne et le 
Canada – Questions & réponses, 28 January 2015, www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr, this may change by a de-
cision of the Joint Committee, which, in addition to delegation, has the power to “change or undertake the 
tasks assigned to a specialised committee” – Art. 26.1, para. 5, let. g), CETA). 
17 Respectively, Art. 5.14, para. 2, let. d); Arts 8.10, para. 3, 8.28, para. 88, and 8.31, para. 3; Arts 
13.18, para. 2, 13.18, para. 3, let. c), and 13.21, para. 3, (among other norms in this last provision); Art. 
20.22, para. 1, all CETA. 
18 Ibid., Art. 26.5, para. 2, let. c). 
19 Ibid., Art. 26.1, para. 1. 
20 Ibid., Art. 26.2, para. 5. 
21 Ibid., Art. 21.6, para. 3. 
22 Ibid., Arts 26.1, para. 4, let. e), and 26.3, paras 1 and 2. 
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interpretation of CETA provisions, which has binding effects to the tribunals that it es-
tablishes; the ability to “make recommendations suitable for promoting the expansion 
of trade and investment as envisaged in [the agreement]”, and to take on any “other ac-
tion in the exercise of its functions as decided by the Parties”.23 While the functions of 
the specialised committees vary (they are specified in their respective chapters), they 
work under the supervision of the Joint Committee and are subject to reporting obliga-
tions.24 There are no provisions regarding the accountability of the Joint Committee, 
which one assumes is subject only to the domestic constitutional rules applicable to the 
representatives of each Party. 
The extensive powers that CETA bodies are given – as exemplified in the observa-
tions above – beg an analysis of the legal status, authority and possible legal effects of 
the decisions that the Joint Committee, and, where applicable, the CETA specialised 
committees (possibly also under delegation from the Joint Committee) may adopt when 
making CETA the living agreement that it is intended to be. These will be decisions of 
international bodies set up by an international agreement to which the EU is party and 
are, as such, an integral part of EU law, in the terms analysed next. 
III. Decisions of international bodies: a source of EU law 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the CJEU had the opportunity to clarify the legal sta-
tus of decisions of international bodies in EU law.25 Since then, established case law de-
termines that, if those decisions are directly connected to an international agreement 
which is part of EU law, they are – as much as the agreements from which they emanate 
– an integral part of the EU legal system.26 This norm was first formulated with regard 
to binding decisions of Association Councils acting under Association Agreements of the 
EU (S. Z. Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie), quite a distant reality from the world of 
international standards.27 Nevertheless, the CJEU extended this same norm to decisions 
of other international bodies set up under international agreements concluded by the 
EU with third countries.  
 
23 Ibid., Arts 26.1, para. 4, let. f), and 26.1, para. 5, let. d), e), f) and i) (emphasis added). 
24 Ibid., Art. 26.1, para. 4, let. b). For the functions of the regulatory cooperation forum, see Art. 21.6, 
para. 2. In fact, the only specification regarding accountability of the Regulatory Cooperation Forum is its 
duty to report to the Joint Committee (Art. 21.6, para. 4, let. c)). 
25 This part adapts and develops the analysis in J. MENDES, EU Law and Global Regulatory Regimes: Hol-
lowing Out Procedural Standards?, in International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2012, pp. 992-995. 
26 Court of Justice: judgment of 14 November 1989, case 30/88, Greece v. Commission, para. 13; judg-
ment of 20 September 1990, case 192/89, S. Z. Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, paras 8-9; judgment of 21 
January 1993, case C-188/91, Deutsche Shell AG v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg, para. 17.  
27 In the case of S. Z. Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, cit., a Turkish national challenged the refusal 
of the Dutch State Secretary of Justice to grant him a residence permit on the grounds that such refusal vio-
lated a decision of the Association Council acting under the Association Agreement with Turkey. 
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In Deutsche Shell AG v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg, the CJEU assessed the status in 
the EU legal order of a recommendation adopted by a Joint Committee under a multilat-
eral agreement concluded by the then European Economic Community (EEC). The Joint 
Committee had been entrusted with the implementation of this agreement. The recom-
mendation defined rules concerning the sealing of goods in transit between the parties to 
the Convention. The German authorities had applied that recommendation in a decision 
that Shell contested in a national court, questioning whether the recommendation was 
part of the EU legal order. The CJEU held that non-binding decisions stemming from the 
application of international agreements that form an integral part of the EU legal system 
are also part of EU law.28 As a result, even if those decisions do not confer enforceable 
rights upon individuals, national courts “are nevertheless obliged to take them into con-
sideration in order to resolve disputes submitted to them, especially when […] they are of 
relevance in interpreting the provisions” of those agreements.29  
While the legal status of decisions of international bodies in EU law has remained 
relatively under-developed both in case law and in academic discussion,30 Deutsche Shell 
AG v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg confirms that this layer of international post-treaty 
regulation is part of EU law irrespective of the binding character of the decisions. The 
justification for this incorporation reveals also (in part) the reasons that, according to 
the Court, ground the authority of those decisions. In the CJEU’s analysis, there is a di-
rect link between the decision and the respective agreement (“unmittelbaren Zusam-
menhang” in the original wording of the CJEU in Deutsche Shell AG v. Hauptzollamt Ham-
burg-Harburg): the decision emanates from a body established under an agreement 
concluded by the EU, and its function is the implementation of that agreement.31 AG 
Van Gerven, relying on previous CJEU judgments, underlined that “the act is placed 
‘within the institutional framework’ of the agreement and ‘gives effect to it’” (i.e. to its 
objectives) – these are crucial factors to determine a “close connection” (“nauwe samen-
 
28 Deutsche Shell AG v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg, cit., para. 17. 
29 Ibid., para. 18.  
30 By contrast to the large literature on the effects of international agreements in EU law, there are rela-
tively few accounts of the effects of international decisions: see B. MARTENCZUK, Decisions of Bodies Established 
by International Agreements and the Community Legal Order, in V. KRONENBERGER (ed.), The European Union and the 
International Legal Order: Discord or Harmony?, The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2001, p. 141 (noting too the mar-
ginal attention given to this topic); N. LAVRANOS, Decisions of International Organizations in the European and Do-
mestic Legal Orders of Selected EU Member States, Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2004, ch. 3; P.J. KUIJPER, 
Customary International Law, Decisions of International Organisations and Other Techniques for Ensuring Respect 
for International Legal rules in European Community Law, in J. WOUTERS, A. NOLLKAEMPER, E. DE WET (eds), The Euro-
peanisation of International Law, The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2008, pp. 96-102; R.A. WESSEL, S. BLOCKMANS, The 
legal status and influence of decisions of international organisations and other bodies in the European Union, in P. 
EECKHOUT, M. LOPEZ-ESCUDERO (eds), The European Union's external action in times of crisis, cit., pp. 223-248; focus-
ing on procedural matters, see J. MENDES, EU Law and Global Regulatory Regimes, cit. On the case law, see sec-
tion IV below. 
31 Deutsche Shell AG v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg, cit., para. 17. 
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hang”) between the agreement and the decision.32 By signing the agreement, the EU 
agreed to entrust decision-making powers to bodies created by the agreement with the 
purpose of giving effect to the latter.33 The consent of the EU (and of the other contract-
ing parties) when concluding the international agreement thus grounds the authority of 
the decisions emanating from the bodies implementing that agreement. According to 
this reasoning, the binding or non-binding nature of the decision is irrelevant in deter-
mining whether or not it is a part of the EU legal order.34 
Consent is a formal justification. This is particularly evident regarding decisions of in-
ternational bodies set up by multilateral agreements, as was the case in Deutsche Shell AG 
v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg. In these cases, the EU participates in the decision-
making process in a different position from the one it has in the context of bilateral 
agreements and the international decisions by which it is bound may be adopted against 
the will of the EU.35 This is quite a different reality from decision-making within Associa-
tion Councils that implement Association Agreements, where the CJEU first established 
the correspondence between the legal status and effects of international decisions in EU 
law and that of the underlying agreement. Here, the EU is virtually “the master of the 
preparation of decisions to be taken”.36 In the case of CETA, the fact that its Joint Commit-
tee adopts decisions and recommendations by mutual consent may bridge the gap be-
tween the original consent – given at the time of the conclusion of the agreement – and 
the reality of decision-making of a body whose function is primarily to “further [the] gen-
eral aims [of the agreement]”, inter alia by adapting it to evolving realities.37 But even the 
decisions of bodies implementing bilateral agreements may be hard to pin-down to the 
consent of the Parties to the agreement. Institutional practice and the need to react to 
shifting realities may substantively bring decision-making away from the original inten-
tions of the drafters of the agreement. Formal as it may be, the case law is clear: by con-
cluding the agreement, the EU consented to the mandate of the bodies thereby estab-
 
32 Opinion of AG Van Gerven delivered on 15 October 1992, case C-188/91, Deutsche Shell AG v. 
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg, para. 10. 
33 See also P. GILSDORF, Les Organes Institués par des Accords Communautaires: Effets Juridiques de Leurs 
Décisions, in Revue du Marché Commun, 1992, p. 332. 
34 Opinion of AG Van Gerven, Deutsche Shell AG v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg, cit., para. 10. 
35 The agreement at stake in Deutsche Shell AG v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg was the Convention 
on a Common Transit Procedure, concluded on 20 May 1987 between the Republic of Austria, the Repub-
lic of Finland, the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway, the Kingdom of Sweden, the Swiss Confed-
eration and the European Economic Community. See also P. GILSDORF, Les Organes Institués par des Accords 
Communautaires, cit., p. 332. 
36 P.J. KUIJPER, Customary International Law, cit., p. 101. 
37 Arts 26.1, para. 4, let. a), and 26.3, para. 3, CETA. Of the specialised committees, CETA only speci-
fies mutual consent for the adoption of decisions of the Financial Services Committee (Art. 13.18, para. 2). 
The other committees may define in their rules of procedure another decision-making rule, except for 
their agenda and meeting schedule, for which CETA determines adoption by mutual consent (Art. 26.2, 
para. 4).  
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lished and it is, as a result, bound by such decisions. The section below will show that this 
is only one among other justifications that the Court has given for the authority of interna-
tional decision in the EU and that, arguably, reinforce this authority.  
IV. The external administrative layer of EU law 
Despite the status of international decisions as a source of EU law, most judgments of 
the CJEU where such decisions feature pertain to the validity or interpretation of EU le-
gal acts that incorporate them and not to the decisions themselves.38 Their formal legal 
status – as an integral part of EU law – appears to have been overshadowed by the mul-
tiple instances in which “dynamic references” incorporate them into EU legislation.39 
Their legal status notwithstanding, this incorporation appears to be the main way by 
which international decisions produce substantive legal effects.  
EU legislation may include explicit references to those decisions; irrespective of a leg-
islative requirement, international decisions may be incorporated into EU non-legislative 
acts; or they may be given legal effects by the regulatory action of EU agencies that might 
follow those decisions or give them a presumption of compliance with EU rules.40 By vir-
tue of their incorporation into EU law, international decisions acquire a legal force they 
did not have at the time of their adoption. The case law analysed below will illustrate their 
possible substantive effects in EU law. As mentioned above, while existing case law refers 
to decisions of international bodies established under international agreements different 
from CETA, the substantive effects mapped here may, in the future, be attributed also to 
CETA bodies’ decisions, for the reasons that will be explained below. 
 
38 See further N. LAVRANOS, Decisions of international organizations, cit., pp. 56-57. S. Z. Sevince v. Staats-
secretaris van Justitie, cit., was a case where the Court ruled on the decision itself and it triggered a long 
litigation on Decision 1/80 of the Association Council established under the EEC-Turkey Association 
Agreement. In Court of Justice, judgment of 7 April 2016, case C-556/14 P, Holcim (Romania) SA v. Commis-
sion, the General Court did not appear to exclude the possibility to rule on the decision at stake, or at 
least that “it could be relied on before the Court” (para. 131; this point is arguably not excluded by the 
Court of Justice’s observation on appeal, where it underlined that the General Court had rejected the ap-
plicant’s pleas on other grounds). 
39 Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón delivered on 29 April 2014, case C-399/12, Federal Republic of Germany 
v. Council, para. 85. 
40 The case law analysed below provides examples of the first two instances. An example of the third 
is the international guidelines on the quality, safety and efficacy of pharmaceutical products used by the 
European Medicines Agency to assess the applications for the authorization of medicines and that the 
agency considers to reflect “the best or most appropriate way to fulfil an obligation laid down in the [Un-
ion] pharmaceutical legislation” (European Medicines Agency (EMA), Procedure for European Union Guide-
lines and Related Documents within the Pharmaceutical Legislative Framework, London, 18 March 2009, 
Doc.Ref. EMEA/P/24143/2004 REV. 1 corr (hereinafter, “EMA Procedural Guidelines”), pp. 4 and 5, paras 
2.1 and 2.2. 
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iv.1. Interpretative effects: validating EU law 
International decisions may be a source of interpretation of an EU legal act. In Deutsche 
Shell AG v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg, the Court made it clear that national courts 
should use international decisions in interpreting the provisions of the “parent” agree-
ment.41 That they can also have interpretative effects regarding EU legislation was 
shown, more recently, in the Philip Morris Brands SARL et al. judgment, where the Court 
was called upon to assess the validity of the Revision of the Tobacco Products Directive 
(hereinafter, Tobacco Products Directive).42 Philip Morris and British American Tobacco 
challenged, on the grounds of incorrect use of Art. 114 TFEU (amongst other pleas), the 
legality of the Tobacco Products Directive’s prohibition on placing onto the market to-
bacco products with a characterising flavour. The guidelines adopted by the Conference 
of the Parties to the World Health Organisation Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control (FCTC) – to which the Tobacco Products Directive refers – were an important el-
ement of the applicable legal framework and served as an anchor to the CJEU’s judg-
ment that the Tobacco Products Directive was valid.43 Those guidelines recommend the 
removal or restriction of the use of ingredients that increase the palatability of tobacco, 
without distinction. This was the CJEU’s argument in holding that the legislator “could 
properly” subject all characterising flavours to the same rules.44  
Having established the reasonableness of the norm, the CJEU still needed to deter-
mine whether the legislator had made proper use of Art. 114 TFEU. For this purpose, 
divergences between the regulatory systems of Member States on the regulation of 
those flavours either need to exist or may be envisaged. Disparities did exist at the time 
of the adoption of the Tobacco Products Directive, the CJEU found on the basis of its re-
citals. The CJEU went further: absent EU harmonisation, future national measures would 
lead to more disparate rules. The argument was the existence of international guide-
lines. Since these recommend the prohibition or restriction of the use of characterising 
flavours, thereby affording a “broad discretion” to the Contracting Parties, “it is foresee-
able, with a sufficient degree of probability, that in the absence of measures at EU level, 
 
41 Deutsche Shell AG v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg, cit., para. 18. See also Court of Justice, judg-
ment of 19 November 1998, case C-162/97, Criminal proceedings against Gunnar Nilsson Per Olov Hagelgren 
and Solweig Arrborn, para. 49. 
42 Court of Justice, judgment of 4 May 2016, case C-547/14, Philip Morris Brands SARL et al. For the Di-
rective see Directive 2014/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning 
the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco and related products and repealing Directive 
2011/37/EC. 
43 See Art. 1 of Directive 2014/40/EU. 
44 Philip Morris Brands SARL et al., cit., paras 108-110 and 114-115. 
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the relevant national rules could develop in divergent ways”.45 The CJEU could then con-
clude that the object of the marketing prohibition was – somewhat paradoxically (if one 
relies only on internal market considerations) – the facilitation of the smooth function-
ing of the internal market.46  
In this two-fold way, the guidelines of the Conference of the Parties became, 
through interpretation of the Tobacco Products Directive, a legal argument to support 
the validity of an EU harmonisation measure. They enabled the CJEU to ascertain the 
reasonableness of the legislator’s choice to prohibit the use of all characterising fla-
vours – since such a general prohibition was set out in the recommendations; and, as 
part of the applicable legal framework, they allowed the CJEU to establish the likelihood 
that future national measures would create disparities in the internal market. Irrespec-
tive of the soundness of the EU legislator’s choice to prohibit those ingredients, it is 
noteworthy that – as an interpretative tool – those guidelines were indirectly invoked 
against the parties that challenged the validity of the Tobacco Products Directive. 
iv.2. Authoritative international decisions  
The guidelines at stake are not binding, as the Court of Justice recalled. Nevertheless, 
four arguments led the CJEU to conclude that the FCTC guidelines are, nevertheless, au-
thoritative and “intended to have a decisive influence” on the Tobacco Products Di-
rective’s rules.47 First, the FCTC specifies that the guidelines of the Conference of the 
Parties are meant “to assist the Contracting Parties in implementing the binding provi-
sions of that convention”.48 The authority of the guidelines therefore stems from the 
regulatory powers conferred upon the Conference of the Parties and from the purpose 
of those powers. In this case, one could see in this argument a concretisation of the 
consent rationale, as it results from Deutsche Shell AG v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg. 
But this is not the only justification for their authority. The Court’s additional (second) 
argument was that the guidelines are based on the best available scientific evidence 
and on “the experience of the Parties to the FCTC”.49 Moreover, and thirdly, they have 
been adopted by consensus, including by the EU and by its Member States.50 Finally, 
 
45 Philip Morris Brands SARL et al., cit., paras 118-120 (emphasis added). The need to adapt EU law to 
the guidelines was also invoked in para. 99 to support the claim that disparities were likely to occur re-
garding the packaging and labelling of tobacco products. 
46 Ibid., paras 116-117. 
47 Ibid., para. 113. 
48 Ibid., para. 111. 
49 Ibid., para. 112. 
50 Ibid. Whether this feature will be present in other cases will largely depend on the respective con-
stitutive agreements. 
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the EU legislature made an “express decision to take those recommendations into ac-
count” in the Tobacco Products Directive, as its recitals confirm.51  
Although this reasoning was developed in the framework of a multilateral agree-
ment, the same arguments could arguably also be invoked regarding future decisions 
(including recommendations) of CETA bodies. The type of international agreement at 
stake does not seem to be an obstacle to extend these arguments to decisions with 
analogous characteristics, beyond the case of Philip Morris Brands SARL et al. The same 
applies to the formal role of the EU in the decision-making processes of international 
bodies. In the Federal Republic of Germany v. Council of the European Union case the CJEU 
grounded the ability of non-binding decisions to produce legal effects (for the purposes 
of Art. 281, para. 9, TFEU) on some of the same arguments, although in that instance 
the EU was not a party to the underlying agreement.52 The Court grounded those deci-
sions’ authority on their purpose, as established in the international agreement, com-
bined with the competence this agreement attributed to Federal Republic of Germany v. 
Council of the European Union,53 and on the fact that the EU legislator incorporated 
those recommendations in EU law.54  
Three of the four arguments the CJEU used in the Philip Morris Brands SARL et al. 
case would apply to decisions and recommendations of the CETA bodies: their mandate 
and the purpose of their decisions, i.e. achieving the objectives of the agreement; the 
fact that, at least judging from their composition, they should gather the relevant exper-
tise; and their adoption by mutual consent. The latter is only required for decisions and 
recommendations of the Joint Committee and of the Financial Committee, but it is not 
excluded that specialised committees specify the same requirement in their rules of 
procedure.55 The argument of expertise is stronger in the case of decisions of the spe-
cialised committees than in the case of acts of the Joint Committee, given the combined 
requirements that all competent authorities for each issue on the agenda be represent-
ed and that each issue be discussed “at the adequate level of expertise”.56 
Whether or not EU legislation will contain “dynamic references” to the acts of these 
bodies cannot, of course, be established at this point, but it is not an unlikely scenario 
given that those references are common in EU legislation and stem from the interna-
tional obligations of the EU. While incorporation may be a strong basis to ascertain that 
 
51 Ibid., para. 113. 
52 Court of Justice, judgment of 7 October 2014, case C-399/12, Federal Republic of Germany v. Council 
of the European Union [GC]. 
53 In this case, one cannot read these arguments through the prism of consent, as the EU is not a 
party to the agreement (Federal Republic of Germany v. Council of the European Union [GC], cit., para. 52, 
see also para. 5; the Commission’s participation in the meetings of the International Organisation of Vine 
and Wine’s bodies cannot be a considered a surrogate to consent of the parties). 
54 Federal Republic of Germany v. Council of the European Union [GC], cit., paras 59, 60 and 61. 
55 See footnote 39.  
56 Art. 26.2, para. 5, CETA. 
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the substantive effects of international decisions were intended by the EU (including by 
its legislator), neither Philip Morris Brands SARL et al. nor Federal Republic of Germany v. 
Council of the European Union make it a necessary, or sole, condition of the authority of 
international decisions in EU law. 
iv.3. A next step for interpretative effects? 
One of the reasons for attributing authority to international decisions – technical com-
petence – was again invoked in a more recent judgment of the CJEU. The case regarded 
the validity of a Commission regulation provision that sets at 65 the age beyond which 
pilots of commercial aircrafts can no longer exercise this function; specifically, it con-
cerned this norm’s compatibility with the Charter prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of age (Art. 21, para. 1, of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union). One of the questions at stake was whether this limitation on the prohibition of 
discrimination – intended to ensure air traffic safety – is necessary, under a proportion-
ality test. The CJEU recalled that the EU institutions have broad discretion when setting 
a precise age limit beyond which one may presume the deterioration of physical capaci-
ties, because of the complex medical assessments and uncertainty involved. Neverthe-
less, the choices based on those assessments must be grounded on objective criteria 
and need to respect fundamental rights. This point was clearer in the Advocate Gen-
eral’s opinion, which the Court followed.57 With a view to determining whether this spe-
cific choice was based on objective criteria, AG Bobek resorted to the international 
standards of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), to which both the ena-
bling regulation and the Commission regulation referred in their recitals.  
According to the Advocate General, international standards generally “may be con-
sidered to form a crucial element of such objective criteria”;58 the standards specifically 
applicable to this case are “a valuable element in the assessment of proportionality” of 
the norm at stake.59 Why? The reasoning is as follows: 
“As they are based on extensive professional debate and expertise, they lay solid ground for 
the justification of the age limit, acting as objective and reasonable references for decision-
makers. […] They demonstrate the consensus and good practice in a technical field which is 
international by nature”.60 
 
57 Court of Justice, judgment of 5 July 2017, case C-190/16, WernerFries v. Lufthansa CityLine GmbH, pa-
ras 59-63; Opinion of AG Bobek delivered on 21 March 2017, case C-190/16, WernerFries v. Lufthansa City-
Line GmbH, paras 51-52. 
58 Opinion of AG Bobek, WernerFries v. Lufthansa CityLine GmbH, cit., para. 52 (emphasis added). 
59 Ibid., para. 56 (enphasis added).  
60 Ibid., para. 56 (emphasis added). See, too, judgment in WernerFries v. Lufthansa CityLine GmbH, cit., 
para. 63.  
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The CJEU followed this opinion, holding that international standards are an important 
element in assessing the objectivity – and, thereby, the necessity – of a choice of the EU in-
stitutions that restricts a fundamental right. The Court further decided (equally following 
the Advocate General’s opinion) that the legislature was not required to make an individual 
examination of the physical and mental capabilities of each holder of a pilot’s licence after 
the age beyond which it could objectively presume the deterioration of those capabilities. A 
general risk assessment embedded in international rules combined with progressive aged-
based limitations – the legislature’s choice in this case – could reasonably replace such an 
individual examination. This choice was “firmly rooted in the relevant international rules, 
which are themselves based on the current state of expertise in that field”.61  
In one point, the Advocate General went farther than the CJEU in his assessment of 
the legal weight of international rules. Specifically regarding the choice to set the age limit 
at 65, he considered that “to call such a standard into question would require rather a ro-
bust case supported by strong evidence, which has not been presented in this case”.62 In 
this line of reasoning, international rules would have an additional substantive effect: they 
would raise the standard of proof to contest the validity of an EU law provision which in-
corporates them. What makes these standards authoritative – their technical quality that 
reveals consensus and good practice in a technical field – would give them the ability to 
set evidentiary standards. While the CJEU has not explicitly endorsed this consequence, it 
has hitherto shown a virtually unconditional reliance on the technical quality of interna-
tional standards.63 Their presumed technical quality – common to both the Werner Fries v. 
Lufthansa CityLine GmbH and the Philip Morris Brands SARL et al. judgments – reinforces the 
substantive effects that the case law gradually spells out. Even if they do not explicitly 
raise the standard of proof in validity cases, at least the EU norms that incorporate those 
standards appear to be impervious to substantive legality challenges, insofar as technical 
and scientific assessments are concerned. 
iv.4. Validating, but not invalidating EU law 
While international decisions may, as interpretative tools, support the validity of EU leg-
islative and non-legislative acts – enabling the Court to establish the correct use of a le-
gal basis, the reasonableness of the legislator’s choice and the necessity of a restriction 
 
61 WernerFries v. Lufthansa CityLine GmbH, cit., para. 65 and Opinion of AG Bobek, WernerFries v. 
Lufthansa CityLine GmbH, cit., paras 60-61. 
62 Opinion of AG Bobek, WernerFries v. Lufthansa CityLine GmbH, cit., para. 58. 
63 The grounds to ascertain that quality may be feeble. In Philip Morris Brands SARL et al., cit., para. 
112, the Court established that the recommendations were based on the best available scientific evi-
dence and expertise of the Parties on the basis of the text of the guidelines themselves. In doing so, it 
arguably took the text at face value (see the guidelines to which the Court referred: World Health Organi-
zation, Partial Guidelines for Implementation of Articles 9 and 10 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobac-
co Control, in FCTC, 2012, www.who.int. 
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upon a fundamental right – they do not seem to ground a claim of invalidity of an EU 
measure. This was at least the case in Holcim (Romania) SA v. Commission.64 At stake was 
the legality of the Commission’s refusal to disclose, for confidentiality reasons, the local-
isation of greenhouse gas emission allowances allegedly stolen from a Romanian com-
pany (Holcim). The applicant invoked, amongst other pleas, the illegality of the applica-
ble Commission’s regulation, arguing that it was incompatible with the annex of a deci-
sion of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), acting as the meeting of the parties to the Kyoto Protocol.65 
The General Court examined the decision and rejected the applicant’s claim that the in-
formation listed therein should be characterised as non-confidential.66 
The General Court did not exclude a priori the possibility that the provision of EU law at 
stake would be considered invalid for breach of an international decision. On the contrary, 
it engaged in the merits of the applicant’s argument and, in doing so, interpreted the rele-
vant provisions of the international decision. The fact that the applicable EU legislation, in-
cluding the Commission regulation at stake, implements the Kyoto Protocol and contains 
various references to decisions adopted pursuant to the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol 
was recalled by the CJEU when establishing the background to the dispute, but this was not 
a relevant consideration either in the applicant’s pleas or in the CJEU’s reasoning.67  
Unlike the cases examined above, there was a reference (albeit brief) to the legal 
status of the decision in the EU legal order. Replying to the applicant’s plea of illegality, 
the Commission contended that the annex of the international decision is not part of 
the EU legal order because “it has not been approved by the Union”.68 It appears that 
the Commission tried to contradict the S. Z. Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie prece-
dent (extended in Deutsche Shell AG v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg to multilateral 
agreements), suggesting that a prior Union approval is required before decisions 
adopted by international bodies (established by international agreements of which the 
Union is party) become an integral part of EU law.69 The General Court did not react di-
rectly to this claim, although it appeared to contradict it: “even if [the annex to the in-
ternational decision] forms part of the [EU] legal order and may be relied on before the 
Court”, the applicant’s plea was rejected on other grounds. In the Court’s view, the in-
 
64 Holcim (Romania) SA v. Commission, cit. 
65 General Assembly, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 20 January 1994, 
A/RES/48/189. 
66 Holcim (Romania) SA v. Commission, cit., paras 132-135. 
67 Ibid., paras 6-7. 
68 Ibid., para. 130.  
69 This cannot be an indirect reference to Art. 218, para. 9, TFEU (on this norm, see infra, section V), 
since nothing in this provision requires the approval of the international decision by the Union, only the 
definition by the Council of the position to be negotiated on the Union’s behalf. Invoking such a dualistic 
system with regard to international decisions, as suggested by the Commission, see B. MARTENCZUK, Deci-
sions of Bodies Established by International Agreements, cit., p. 162. 
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ternational decision at stake did not apply to EU emission allowances, but to Kyoto 
units. While related (they both express a certain quantity of carbon dioxide equivalent 
for transaction purposes), the General Court held that they are different realities (they 
have a different nature, purpose and addressees) and, therefore, the respective confi-
dentiality rules are equally distinct. For this reason – but not because of the inability of 
an international decision to ground the invalidity of an EU measure – the General Court 
concluded that the applicant could not argue that the EU regulation infringed the inter-
national decision in this case.70 
The ambiguity of both the General Court’s statement regarding the legal status of the 
decision in EU law and of the Commission’s argument that incorporation required an EU 
act of approval persisted in the judgment on appeal.71 The CJEU said nothing directly re-
garding the status of the international decision in EU law (more precisely, of its annex) – it 
framed the question as a matter of establishing what the General Court had or had not 
accepted. The Court of Justice held that the General Court “did not accept” that the annex 
to the international decision is part of the EU legal order (rebutting the applicant’s claim), 
but rather rejected its plea on other grounds.72 Following S. Z. Sevince v. Staatssecretaris 
van Justitie and Deutsche Shell AG v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg (which neither Court 
explicitly mentions in this case), the decision at stake is undoubtedly part of EU law, since 
the European Union has approved the Kyoto Protocol (itself then an integral part of the 
EU legal order since its entry into force).73 The CJEU does not seem to deny the applicabil-
ity of S. Z. Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie and Deutsche Shell AG v. Hauptzollamt Ham-
burg-Harburg to this case. As it simply pointed out that the General Court decided the case 
on other grounds, it – again – did not entertain the question of whether the international 
decision could have been a ground to establish the illegality of the Commission’s refusal.74 
Even if the Commission’s plea at first instance could have been an attempt to revise the S. 
Z. Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie and Deutsche Shell AG v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-
Harburg case law (or at least to limit its scope of application) – seeking the recognition of a 
duality system in which an international decision is only incorporated into EU law if previ-
 
70 Holcim (Romania) SA v. Commission, cit., paras 9 and 138-146. 
71 The ambiguity is perhaps more evident in the French version of the texte: “[à] supposer même que 
l’annexe à la décision 13/CMP.1 fasse partie de l’ordre juridique de l’Union et soit invocable devant le Tri-
bunal” (Holcim (Romania) SA v. Commission, cit., para. 131).  
72 Holcim (Romania) SA v. Commission, cit., para. 61. See supra, section II. 
73 Court of Justice, judgment of 21 December 2011, case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America 
et al. v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, para. 73. In this case, the Court also held that the 
nature and broad logic of the Kyoto Protocol prevent it from being relied upon in the context of a prelim-
inary reference procedure to contest the validity of an EU act (paras 73-78). The Court of Justice invoked 
the procedures for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, as established therein, and the flexibility 
awarded to the Parties on the implementation of their commitments to conclude that “the parties to the 
protocol may comply with their obligations in the manner and at the speed upon which they agree”. 
74 I am grateful to Marise Cremona for a discussion on this point. 
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ously approved by the EU – this was clearly not the route either CJEU took in Holcim (Ro-
mania) SA v. Commission.  
It is by returning to S. Z. Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie and Deutsche Shell AG v. 
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg (the latter insofar as it extends the former rule to multi-
lateral agreements) that one may indicate the conditions under which an international 
decision that is part of EU law could serve as a basis to invalidate EU law. According to 
established case law regarding international agreements, the validity of an act of the EU 
may be affected if it is incompatible with international norms, as long as the following 
conditions are fulfilled: the EU is bound by those rules; the nature and the broad logic 
of the agreement do not preclude direct effect; and the provisions relied upon are un-
conditional and sufficiently precise.75 Following S. Z. Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 
arguably the same conditions could be extended to provisions of international deci-
sions.76 Once it is established that the international decision binds the EU, the nature 
and purpose of the agreement – against which the decisions adopted for the agree-
ment’s implementation must be assessed – and the scheme of the decisions that im-
plement it will determine whether direct effect is precluded. The ability of individuals to 
base claims regarding the validity of EU legal acts on provisions of international deci-
sions binding on the EU will depend on this assessment (and on whether those provi-
sions are unconditional and sufficiently precise).77  
The agreement and the implementing decision are different legal acts. The exclu-
sion of direct effect of provisions of the agreement may not necessarily imply the exclu-
sion of direct effect of provisions of the decisions of its bodies. In fact, the Court has 
held that the nature and structure of an agreement whose provisions do not have di-
rect effect (inter alia because their legal effects presuppose the adoption of implemen-
tation decisions by bodies set up by the agreement) may confirm the direct effect of 
 
75 See, inter alia, Court of Justice: judgment of 26 October 1982, case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v. 
C.A. Kupfberg & Cie KG a.A., paras 22 and 23; judgment of 3 June 2008, case C-308/06, The Queen, on the 
application of International Association of Independent Tankers Owners (Intertanko) et al. v. Secretary of State 
for Transport, paras 43-45 and Air Transport Association of America et al. v. Secretary of State for Energy and 
Climate Change, cit., paras 51-54. On these conditions, see, e.g., P. EECKHOUT, EU External Relations Law, Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 331-355. 
76 S. Z. Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie, cit., paras 14-15. It is noteworthy that the particularity of 
decisions of Association Councils in the context of Association Agreements (see P.J. KUIJPER, Customary 
International Law, cit.) has not prevented the transposition of that case law to a very different context (in 
Deutsche Shell AG v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg, cit.). The specificity of the S. Z. Sevince v Staatssecreta-
ris van Justitie case may raise doubts regarding the ability to transpose that case law to other cases, as the 
Commission appeared to have hinted at in Holcim (Romania) SA v. Commission. However, to the author’s 
knowledge, no subsequent case has restricted the scope of application of the S. Z. Sevince v Staatssecreta-
ris van Justitie rule. 
77 This reasoning follows the Opinion of AG Darmon delivered on 15 May 1990, case C-192/89, S. Z. 
Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, paras 12, 19 and 33.  
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provisions of the implementing decisions.78 Yet, this case law referred to agreements 
that did not contain a clause excluding direct effect. Only in the absence of such clauses 
does the CJEU engage in the interpretation of the provisions of an international agree-
ment to determine whether they can have direct effect.79 The question then is whether 
such a clause of an international agreement may also preclude the direct effect of the 
decisions that implement it. In CETA, the choice of the Parties concerning direct effect 
could hardly be clearer: “nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as conferring 
rights or imposing obligations on persons other than those created between the Parties 
under public international law, nor as permitting this Agreement to be directly invoked 
in the domestic legal systems of the Parties”.80 The sweeping terms of this clause may 
defeat an argument that the scheme of the decision may enable a conclusion of direct 
effect when the provisions of agreement itself cannot have that effect, if, as defended 
by AG Darmon in S. Z. Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, the purpose and nature of 
these decisions should be assessed against the underlying agreement.81 
Nevertheless, the preclusion of a right of judicial action against the legal acts of the 
Parties – that could ground the invalidity of EU law for breaching international decisions 
– does not prevent the production of substantive legal effects via interpretation of EU 
law provisions, as the examples examined above show.82 Since those decisions are 
binding on the EU, the EU Courts should interpret EU law in conformity with those deci-
sions, in line with the EU’s international law obligations.83  
 
78 Court of Justice, judgment of 30 September 1987, Demirel and Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd, paras 21 to 
24 and S. Z. Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, cit., paras 19 and 20. I am grateful to Marise Cremona for 
pointing this out. 
79 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupfberg & Cie KG a.A., cit., para. 17. 
80 See too B. MARTENCZUK, Decisions of Bodies Established by International Agreements, cit., p. 160. Art. 
30.6, para. 1, CETA. Para. 2 adds: “A Party shall not provide for a right of action under its domestic law 
against the other Party on the ground that a measure of the other Party is inconsistent with this Agree-
ment”. For a strong normative repudiation of clauses excluding direct effect in trade agreements, see E.-
U. PETERSMANN, Transformative Transatlantic Free Trade Agreements, cit. 
81 Opinion of AG Darmon, S. Z. Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, cit., para. 12. 
82 Sub-sections IV.1. and IV.3. See also The Queen, on the application of International Association of In-
dependent Tankers Owners (Intertanko) et al. v. Secretary of State for Transport, cit., para. 52, referring to an 
international agreement. 
83 See, e.g, Court of Justice, judgment of 18 March 2014, case C-363/12, Z v. A Government Department 
and The Board of management of a community School [GC], para. 75, albeit referring to consistent interpre-
tation of EU acts with international agreements. Arguably, the principle of consistent interpretation ap-
plies irrespective of whether the EU act being interpreted was adopted to implement the international 
decision (P. EECKHOUT, EU External Relations Law, cit., pp. 356-357). 
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V. Strong in substance, weak in procedure 
The CJEU have not merely acknowledged the ability of decisions of international bodies 
to have a “direct impact on the European Union’s acquis”,84 an impact that is intended 
and effected either through legislative incorporation or via the consent given to interna-
tional agreements setting up decision-making bodies. The CJEU have furthermore justi-
fied their authority and have reinforced it by spelling out the substantive effects that 
those decisions may produce. Nevertheless, they remain oblivious to the procedural 
legitimacy of such decisions. This is not to say that it should be the role of the CJEU to 
filter the reception of international decisions according to procedural legitimacy stand-
ards accepted in the EU. The constitutional grounds exist.85 Yet, there are also signifi-
cant hurdles to the CJEU’ jurisdiction to review international decisions. They can inter-
pret them to avoid divergent interpretations that could hinder the uniform application 
of EU law.86 But these are not legal acts of the “institutions, bodies, offices or agencies 
of the Union” over whose validity the Court could rule.87 For the same reason, reviewing 
their compliance with the procedures established in the underlying agreement is also, 
in principle, excluded. One could argue that if a decision of an international body is part 
of EU law because of its direct connection to the agreement, its validity depends on two 
conditions: the body that adopted it has the required powers under that agreement 
 
84 Federal Republic of Germany v. Council of the European Union [GC], cit., paras 63-64. 
85 J. MENDES, EU Law and Global Regulatory Regimes, cit., pp. 1016-1017. 
86 S. Z. Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, cit., paras 10-11; Deutsche Shell AG v. Hauptzollamt Ham-
burg-Harburg, cit., para. 19 (where, however there is no reference to the functional or other justification of 
jurisdiction); see also Holcim (Romania) SA v. Commission, cit., paras 132-137 and 144, simply interpreting 
the provisions of an international decision.  
87 General Court, judgment of 22 July 2005, case T-376/04, Polyelectrolyte Producers Group v. Council of 
the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, para. 31. In this case, the General Court 
considered (in a judgment upheld on appeal) that the case law according to which the Court may rule on 
the validity of the internal act whereby the EU concludes an international agreement (not on the validity 
of the agreement itself – Court of Justice, judgment of 9 August 1994, case C-327/91, French Republic v. 
Commission of the European Communities, paras 13-17) could not apply in the same terms to an act estab-
lishing the EU position regarding a decision of an international body (ibid., para. 35; see too Court of Jus-
tice, judgment of 8 December 2006, case C-368/05, Polyelectrolyte Producers Group v. Council of the Euro-
pean Union and Commission of the European Communities, paras 50 and 55). In the case of international 
decisions, unlike international agreements, there is no EU act “concluding” an external act, on whose va-
lidity the Court could rule (I am grateful to Marise Cremona for a discussion on this issue). The act that 
may be subject to a validity challenge is the prior Council decision establishing the position of the EU (Art. 
218, para. 9, TFEU), the equivalent of which in Polyelectrolyte Producers Group the Court held was lacking 
the requisite direct and individual concern. In the case of legislative incorporation, the EU act that applies 
the international decision can be challenged. It should be noted that an act of incorporation is not a nec-
essary condition of the validity (and authority) of international decisions in EU law (see sub-section IV.2.; 
for a contrary view, see B. MARTENCZUK, Decisions of Bodies Established by International Agreements, cit., pp. 
158-162, assuming that, contrary to institutional practice, a decision pursuant Art. 218, para. 9, TFEU 
should precede incorporation). 
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and the decision complied with the procedures established therein.88 The former condi-
tion is covered by the S. Z. Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie case law. Assessing the 
latter (i.e. whether the decision complies with the procedures defined in the agreement) 
seems to be outside the remit of the Court, insofar as it would amount to reviewing acts 
of non-EU bodies, even if, de iure condendo, this should be a condition defining the sta-
tus of international decisions in EU law.89 Although the CJEU has on more than one oc-
casion adopted an extensive interpretation of these Treaty requirements of a reviewa-
ble act – and, therefore, of its jurisdiction – to the author’s knowledge, it has never ruled 
directly on the validity of an international decision.90 
At the same time, there is an important procedural disconnect. Regardless of the 
substantive effects that these decisions end up acquiring by effect of their reception in-
to EU law, their procedures are fundamentally a matter of the regulatory regimes estab-
lished under international law.91 These may suit the nature those decisions have at the 
international level (often, non-binding guidance reflecting or defining regulatory best 
practices in technical fields, adopted at the discretion of regulators meeting in interna-
tional fora with few procedural constraints). Nevertheless, they fall short of procedural 
rules that would be warranted to ensure the impartiality, transparency, the protection 
 
88 B. MARTENCZUK, Decisions of Bodies Established by International Agreements, cit., p. 157. 
89 The views of those authors that uphold the ability of the CJEU to rule on the validity of internation-
al decisions are based on defensible normative views, but, arguably, do not reflect the current status of 
EU law (see P. EECKHOUT, EU External Relations Law, cit., pp. 291, 275-276; similarly, K. LENAERTS, D. ARTS, I. 
MASELIS, Procedural Law of the European Union, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2006, p. 354, cautiously setting 
out “an impression” that the Court also has jurisdiction to review validity matters). See, however, Opinion 
of AG Van Gerven, Deutsche Shell AG v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg, cit., paras 11 and 17, stating that 
the Court has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation and validity of international 
decisions. Admittedly, in S. Z. Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, cit., the Court linked its jurisdiction to 
give preliminary rulings over international decisions to its jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings over in-
ternational agreements, without distinguishing questions of interpretation from questions of validity, in 
line with Art. 267, para. 1, let. b), TFEU (see paras 10-11). Nevertheless, at stake was a matter of interpre-
tation (in the judgment in Deutsche Shell AG v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg, cit., it is clearer that the ju-
risdiction is restricted to matters of interpretation – paras 18-19; see too Court of Justice, judgment of 27 
October 2016, case C-613/14, James Elliott Construction Limited v. Irish Asphalt Limited, paras 34-35, justify-
ing jurisdiction of the CJEU to interpret acts of private standardisation bodies with the need to avoid di-
vergent interpretations in the Member States, in line with S. Z. Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, cit., 
para. 11). 
90 In Court of Justice, judgment of 3 September 2008, joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05, Yassin 
Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of 
the European Communities [GC], the Court stressed that it was reviewing the EU act implementing the UN 
Security Council measure, not the measure itself (paras 286-287) and asserted that the jurisdiction over 
international agreements, with a view to preserving the constitutional principles of the EU, covers the EU 
implementing act but not the agreement itself (para. 285). It is well known that UN Security Council 
measures are not decisions adopted by an international body set up by an international agreement. Yet, 
arguably, the same reasoning would apply to these cases. 
91 J. MENDES: EU Law and Global Regulatory Regimes, cit.; Rule of Law and Participation, cit. 
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of rights and legally protected interests of decisions that “decisively [influence]” the con-
tent of EU law and, even possibly, the standards of proof in judicial disputes involving 
individuals (even if only indirectly, given their presumed technical quality).92  
The procedural weakness of the rules guiding the adoption of decisions of interna-
tional bodies will be illustrated here by an analysis of the relevant CETA provisions. As 
stated, the decisions and recommendations of Joint Committee or of its specialised 
committees will be international decisions that are part of EU law and may have sub-
stantive effects analogous to those examined above. Following Deutsche Shell AG v. 
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Harburg and Federal Republic of Germany v. Council of the Europe-
an Union, the non-binding nature of its recommendations does not prevent them from 
producing legal effects in a way similar to binding decisions. CETA contains no provision 
regarding the procedure for the adoption of decisions or recommendations by its Joint 
Committee (the Committee itself will likely define them in its rules of procedure).93 It 
merely specifies that decisions and recommendations are adopted by “mutual con-
sent”,94 a quality that will contribute to reinforcing their authority in EU law, as the cases 
of Philip Morris Brands SARL et al. and WernerFries v. Lufthansa CityLine GmbH illustrated. 
In addition, the agreement is cautious regarding the protection of confidential infor-
mation (i.e. information considered as such by either Party) that the Parties may submit 
to the Joint Committee (or to any of the other committees).95 These are the only specifi-
cations regarding decision-making by the Joint Committee. 
Insofar as the specialised committees may have the power to adopt decisions and 
recommendations, they are bound by the rules of the chapters that establish them and 
by the rules of procedure that they may set for themselves. 96 A cursory look at the spe-
cialised committees indicates that either no binding procedural rules structure their de-
cision-making or there are only a few specifications regarding, for instance, the regulari-
ty of their meetings.97 They may establish working groups, whose procedural rules, one 
assumes, might be specified in rules of procedure. The picture that emerges is clearly 
one where a concern for procedural constraints over the powers of those committees – 
those that could ground objective controls or facilitate the protection of rights and legal 
interests – is virtually non-existent. In the case of the Regulatory Cooperation Forum 
(the body that, among other tasks, may examine opportunities for harmonisation and 
 
92 Federal Republic of Germany v. Council of the European Union [GC], cit., paras 63-64; Opinion AG 
Bobek, Werner Fries v. Lufthansa CityLine GmbH, cit., examined above. 
93 See Chapter 26 on “Administrative and Institutional Provisions” and Art. 26.1, para. 2, and para. 4, 
let. d), CETA. 
94 Ibid., Art. 26.3, para. 3. 
95 Ibid., Art. 26.4. 
96 As noted above, they may also acquire by delegation of the Joint Committee the power to adopt 
decisions. 
97 Art. 5.14, paras 4-9, CETA. 
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mutual recognition), the only procedural specification regarding its activities is its ability 
to consult private entities: 
“In order to gain non-governmental perspectives on matters that relate to the implementation 
of this Chapter, each Party or the Parties may consult, as appropriate, with stakeholders 
and interested parties, including representatives from academia, think-tanks, non-
governmental organisations, businesses, consumer and other organisations. These consul-
tations may be conducted by any means the Party or Parties deem appropriate”.98 
Consultations have a very specific and explicit function: they are a source through 
which the Regulatory Cooperation Forum may identify “regulatory policy issues of mu-
tual interest” that ground its activities.99 Consultation in this form is not a guarantee 
that ensures the due and transparent consideration of the various legally protected in-
terests that the activities of the Regulatory Cooperation Forum may affect, possibly via 
recommendations or, indirectly, via decisions of the Joint Committee (if the Regulatory 
Cooperation Forum refers a matter to it).100 The choices on who to consult, when, and 
how are fully in the hands of the Regulatory Cooperation Forum and of the Parties’ ex-
ecutives. In the absence of procedural rules, they decide the details of consultation 
based on their regulatory preferences and needs. This feature and the lack of any fur-
ther control mechanisms – such as the duty to provide feedback on the input received 
and to make it transparent – prevent consultations from being a means to structure or 
constrain the authority that this body has been granted by CETA.101 
This lack of concern for procedurally binding the authority of the CETA bodies is in 
contrast to the agreement’s specifications regarding the requirements to which domes-
tic administrative procedures should adhere. While CETA bodies may adopt decisions 
(in the instances defined in the text of the agreement) and recommendations without 
being bound by virtually any procedural rules – except those that they may impose on 
themselves – CETA specifies that the Parties, in their respective domestic regulation 
processes, are bound by duties of transparency. They must, in particular: 
“ensure that its laws, regulations, procedures and administrative rulings of general ap-
plication respecting any matter covered by this Agreement are promptly published or 
made available in such a manner as to enable interested persons and the other Party to 
become acquainted with them”.102 
 
98 Ibid., Art. 21.8 (emphasis added). 
99 Ibid., Art. 21.6, para. 2, let. a). 
100 On the different meanings of participation in the context of regulatory cooperation (analysing 
TTIP), see J. MENDES, Participation in a New Regulatory Paradigm, cit., section 4, p. 12 et seq. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Art. 27.1, para. 1, CETA. 
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This duty entails “to the extent possible” publication of legislative or regulatory pro-
posals and “a reasonable opportunity to comment” on those proposals by interested per-
sons and the other Party.103 Furthermore, the Parties must “administer a measure of gen-
eral application affecting matters covered by this Agreement in a consistent, impartial and 
reasonable manner”.104 For this purpose, “laws, regulations, procedures and administra-
tive rulings of general application” that relate to CETA matters and that apply to “a particu-
lar person, good or service” of the other Party should, “whenever possible”, require notice 
to be given to, and enable the participation by, the person of the other Party who is “di-
rectly affected”.105 CETA equally requires that both parties have suitable domestic mecha-
nisms of review and appeal that are impartial, independent and follow fair procedures.106 
These specifications regarding domestic procedures, means of review and appeal 
are a logical consequence of the very purposes of CETA: the establishment of a free 
trade area (Art. 1.4 CETA) in which measures that could restrict market access and trade 
between the Parties are progressively eliminated and regulatory convergence should be 
pursued. The agreement seeks to address thereby the impact that domestic regulations 
and procedures may have over trade and investment. Fair and transparent domestic 
processes – in any area covered by such a comprehensive economic agreement – are 
an important means of reaching the agreement’s goals. As EU integration shows, the 
establishment of free market areas requires opening not only domestic markets but al-
so domestic law-making procedures to interested persons from other parties.  
Be that as it may, CETA’s ultimate purpose hardly justifies that the institutional bod-
ies that it created to achieve its goals are subject to virtually no procedural rules that 
could structure their authority and bind them to the same normative standards that 
CETA requires from domestic processes: impartiality, transparency, fairness and rea-
sonableness. These can be important standards to ensure the principles set out in Art. 
21, para. 1, TEU. As was shown above, decisions by CETA’s bodies – even if only recom-
mendations – may produce substantive legal effects. They potentially impact the rights 
and legally protected interests of natural and legal persons of both Parties as well as of 
third parties. The formulation “stakeholders and interested parties” that may provide 
“non-governmental perspectives on matters that relate to the implementation” of CETA 
(Art. 21.8 CETA, albeit referring only to the chapter on regulatory cooperation) is broad 
enough to encompass holders of legally protected interests, as enshrined in both legal 
systems, and third parties legally affected by the measures adopted by the CETA bodies. 
But the agreement mostly leaves to the institutional practice of these bureaucratic bod-
 
103 Ibid., Art. 27.1, para. 2. 
104 Ibid., Art. 27.3 (emphasis added). See too Arts 13.11, 15.11, para. 2, 19.17, para. 6, 23.5. 
105 Ibid., Art. 27.3, let. a) and b). 
106 Ibid., Art. 27.4. Art. 6.10, para. 3, demands that, in the field of customs, each Party provides for an 
administrative level of appeal or review “before requiring a person to seek redress at a more formal or 
judicial level”.  
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ies whether and how legally protected interests should be considered and balanced in 
their decision-making procedures, and hence, how the public interests that the agree-
ment serves should be pursued. 
VI. The EU Treaty procedure 
While the international decision-making procedure is a matter of the regulatory regimes 
established under international law, the TFEU envisages an internal EU procedure for 
the establishment of the positions to be taken “on the Union’s behalf” when those bod-
ies acts’ have legal effects.107 Since Federal Republic of Germany v. Council of the European 
Union, these encompass non-binding acts that “are capable of decisively influencing the 
content of [EU law]”, given their purpose, the competence the agreement delegates to 
their authors, and their incorporation into EU legal acts.108 It is for the Council, on a 
proposal from the Commission (or from the High Representative of the Union for For-
eign Affairs and Security Policy), to adopt the Union’s position. The TFEU thus acknowl-
edges the existence of the external administrative layer of EU law. Nevertheless, this 
procedure arguably does little to alleviate normative concerns regarding the impartiali-
ty, transparency, fairness and reasonableness of international decisions that are au-
thoritative in EU law. It is a very thin filter by which to address the weaknesses of the 
procedural constraints (or lack thereof) in international decision-making. 
Despite its external function, establishing the Union’s negotiating position in the de-
cision-making of international bodies has mostly inter-institutional implications, as con-
firmed by the case law.109 What is now Art. 218, para. 9, TFEU was introduced by the 
 
107 This provision covers also the suspension of the application of an agreement. It does not apply to 
“acts supplementing or amending the institutional framework of the agreement”. 
108 Federal Republic of Germany v. Council of the European Union [GC], cit., paras 63-64 (see also paras 59-
61; contrary to the Opinion of the AG Cruz Villalón, Federal Republic of Germany v. Council of the European Un-
ion, cit., paras 84-99). The Organisation of Vine and Wine (hereafter OIV) also established that Art. 218, para. 
9, TFEU is not limited to acts of bodies established by agreements of which the EU is a party. 
109 Court of Justice: judgment of 1 October 2009 case C-370/07, Commission of the European Commu-
nities v. Council of the European Union; judgment of 18 December 2014, case C-81/13, United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Council of European Union [GC], para. 66 (regarding the majority nec-
essary to adopt that the Council’s decision); judgment of 6 October 2015, case C-73/14, Commission of the 
European Communities v. Council of the European Union [GC], paras 63-67 (excluding from its scope the 
submission of statements in the framework of international judicial procedures); case C-600/14, Germany 
v. Council, pending (where the Court is asked to rule on the correct application of Art. 218, para. 9, TFEU in 
case of an international decision that amends the international agreement and on the Union’s compe-
tence to use Art 218, para. 9); Federal Republic of Germany v. Council of the European Union [GC], cit. (ex-
tending the scope of the provision to non-binding acts as acts with legal effects and establishing that the 
EU does not need to be a party to the agreement to trigger the application of Art. 218, para. 9, TFEU). It 
has also implications to the relationships between the Member States and the EU, when the Union is not 
a party to the agreement and its position is expressed via the Member States, or when issues of compe-
tence are at stake (as in Germany v. Council, cit.).  
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Treaty of Amsterdam to allow the Union to “speak with one voice” and defend its inter-
ests more effectively in international bodies, by avoiding the involvement of the Euro-
pean Parliament (under the assent or consultation procedures) that hindered the de-
sired effectiveness.110 Until recently at least, the EU institutions did not apply this provi-
sion in a consistent way, with the Commission dodging it in the field of commercial poli-
cy to avoid upsetting the common ways of working in international practice, and the 
Council seeking to eschew competence issues that could hinder negotiations in other 
areas.111 Recent litigation appears to confirm that Art. 218, para. 9, TFEU acquired a new 
life after the Lisbon Treaty.112 
As a tool to better equip the EU when conducting negotiations in international bod-
ies, this procedure is a means of favouring the EU’s diplomatic efforts in these settings, 
framing and serving the Union interest in the context of those international fora, as it 
will be conveyed by the representatives of the EU institutions and regulators within the 
scope of their mandate. The ability of the Council’s positions to bind the EU representa-
tives and impact the final decision of the international body will depend, respectively, 
on the vagueness or specificity of the decision it adopts and on the negotiating leverage 
of the EU representatives. At the end of the day, international decision-making may very 
well remain largely in the hands of regulators. 
Nevertheless, positions adopted under Art. 218, para. 9, TFEU introduce one control: 
as acts of the Council, they need to respect EU law and are subject to judicial review. On a 
different level, it is not excluded that the formal intervention of the Council may lead to 
deliberations that may favour the consideration of the impact that those decisions may 
have on legally protected interests. Be that as it may, this procedure cannot remedy the 
fact that decisions of expert committees and executive representatives – having potential-
ly important political and legal implications – are adopted in international fora, subject to 
 
110 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 16 July 2015, case C-73/14, Council v. Commission, para. 72 
and footnote 22. A cursory reading of Art. 218 TFEU could convey that the European Parliament should 
be informed also of this step, given the schematic position of Art. 218, para. 10, TFEU (see J. MENDES, EU 
Law and Global Regulatory Regimes, cit., p. 1017). However, the history and purpose of the provision deny 
this interpretation (see too United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Council of European Un-
ion [GC], cit., para. 66, explicitly excluding the Parliament; and Opinion of AG Kokott delivered on 17 July 
2014, case C-81/13, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Council of European Union, foot-
note 63, stressing that Art. 218, para. 9, TFEU is a “separate, simplified procedure […] regulated differently 
from the conventional procedure for the conclusion of international agreements” – emphasis in the origi-
nal). See too B. MARTENCZUK, Decisions of Bodies Established by International Agreements, cit., pp. 153-154, on 
the pre-Lisbon (pre-Nice) situation, indicating that despite the formal rights of the Parliament in some 
cases, the risks for the effective EU participation in international decision-making led the Council to de-
sign specific procedures for the adoption of EU positions. 
111 P.-J. KUIJPER, J. WOUTERS, F. HOFFMEISTER, G. DE BAERE, T. RAMOPOULOS, The Law of EU External Relations, 
cit., p. 86. 
112 Ibid. See also references in footnote 103. A search in eur-lex.europa.eu indicates that the vast ma-
jority of Council decisions of this type was adopted since 2010. 
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virtually no procedural or apparent political control (except those applicable under the 
domestic legal orders of the parties). And, still, they may constitute a significant part of EU 
law, determining and conditioning choices made by the EU legislator.  
The authority and substantive effects of international decisions that allow one to 
characterise them as the external administrative layer of EU law justify, at least, the exten-
sion of the right of the European Parliament to be informed as determined in Art. 218, pa-
ra. 10, TFEU, to also cover this aspect of the EU external action. This role of the European 
Parliament need not be the minimal involvement that would result from merely passively 
receiving information. It should place the European Parliament in the position to under-
stand the policy implications of the decisions that it then incorporates into EU legislative 
acts (if not to exercise its right of democratic scrutiny).113 Despite the tensions between 
this claim and the original purpose of Art. 281, para. 9, TFEU – i.e. ensure the effectiveness 
of international negotiations and, thereby, avoid the involvement of the Parliament – the 
argument is especially compelling in the instances where the Parliament has stronger 
rights of participation in the negotiation of international agreements.114 
VII. The CETA bodies making EU law 
Binding or not, the authority international decisions have in EU law stems from the origi-
nal consent given by the parties to the agreement when defining the mandate of the au-
thors of those decisions; from the expertise that they embody and their presumed tech-
nical quality; from the consensus established among professionals (whether regulators or 
private persons); and from their legislative incorporation into EU law. The decisions of 
CETA bodies are likely to fulfil most of these characteristics and, as such, to have substan-
tive legal effects similar to those that the CJEU has expounded regarding the decisions of 
other international bodies that – as future CETA bodies’ decisions – are an integral part of 
EU law, be it by force of the S. Z. Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie case law or by legisla-
 
113 The origins and purpose of Art. 218, para. 9, TFEU pointed out above may hinder an analogy with 
the Mauritius and Tanzania cases (Court of Justice: judgment of 24 June 2014, case C-658/11, European 
Parliament v. Council [GC], paras 81-86; judgment of 14 June 2016, case C-263/14, European Parliament v. 
Council [GC], paras 68-73) and are in tension with the argument made here. On the scope of Art. 218, pa-
ra. 10, TFEU, see R. PASSOS, The External Powers of the European Parliament, in P. EECKHOUT, M. LOPEZ-
ESCUDERO (eds), The European Union's external action in times of crisis, cit., pp. 125-128, suggesting (albeit 
briefly) that the Parliament’s future involvement in the implementation of international agreements could 
be envisaged in an inter-institutional agreement.  
114 Art. 218, para. 6, let. a) and b), TFEU. Referring to the pre-Lisbon (and pre-Nice) situation, Mar-
tenczuk argued that, if the Council would set up specific procedures for the adoption of the EU position, 
the Parliament should also assent to these procedures in the instances where the assent procedure ap-
plied for the conclusion of the agreement (B. MARTENCZUK, Decisions of Bodies Established by International 
Agreements, cit., p. 154). On the role of the European Parliament in the field of financial services, see M.S. 
BARR, G.P. MILLER, Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel, in European Journal of International Law, 
2006, p. 15 et seq., pp. 36 and 37. 
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tive incorporation. They may ground the validity of EU legislative and non-legislative acts 
and may be indirectly invoked against the parties that contest the legality of these acts for 
alleged incompatibility with EU law. In fact, as in Philip Morris Brands SARL et al. and in Wer-
nerFries v. Lufthansa CityLine GmbH, international decisions may be an interpretative tool 
that ascertains the reasonableness and the necessity of the legislature’s choices – includ-
ing where these restrict fundamental rights – not least because of their presumed tech-
nical quality as expressing the current state of expertise in complex technical fields. Be-
cause of the legal status, authority and substantive effects of those decisions in EU law, 
one may characterise them as the external administrative layer of EU law, which CETA is 
likely to expand. At the same time, significant constraints encumber the ability to chal-
lenge the legality of an EU act for breach of an international decision: lack of direct effect 
might preclude the right of judicial action. In the case of CETA, the sweeping terms of the 
clause precluding direct effect (Art. 30.6 CETA) arguably leave little room to attribute direct 
effect to the decisions implementing the agreement. 
While CETA bodies’ decisions (as decisions of international bodies binding on the 
EU) may shield the validity of EU acts against illegality claims, there are important pro-
cedural weaknesses in the way they are adopted. As far as the agreement is concerned, 
there are virtually no procedural constraints that would bind CETA bodies’ decision-
making to the standards of impartiality, transparency, fairness and reasonableness that 
it imposes on domestic procedures. A judicial role in eventually process-perfecting insti-
tutional practices appears to be excluded. There are, at least, significant obstacles to 
judicial review of the legality of international decisions before CJEU: validity questions 
are in principle outside their jurisdiction and there might not be a subsequent EU act of 
transposition (akin to the concluding act of international agreements). Appellants are 
left with the possibility to challenge the Council decision establishing the Union’s posi-
tion (Art. 218, para. 9, TFEU), whose ability to bind the EU representatives and impact 
the final international decision may vary. 
Given the substantive strength and procedural weaknesses of international deci-
sions, a clause that protects the Parties’ right to regulate, similar to that inserted in 
CETA, while important as a matter of principle, hardly shields the “direct impact” that 
those decisions may have in EU law, which remains “direct” even where supported by 
legislative incorporation.115 Legislative incorporation may be voluntary, but the authori-
ty of these decisions places a high threshold on the EU legislator, should it ever decide, 
for example, to oppose “dynamic references” inserted by the Commission in a legisla-
tive proposal. In the case of CETA, neither the EU nor Canada are obliged to change 
their regulations and, of course, their representatives may not agree on common deci-
sions or recommendations regarding aspects covered by CETA. None of this precludes 
 
115 Federal Republic of Germany v. Council of the European Union [GC], cit., paras 61 and 64. Arts. 21.2, 
para. 4, let. c), 21.2, para. 6, and Art. 21.5 CETA. 
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the conclusion that, when functioning smoothly, CETA’s institutional structure allows 
Canadian and EU executive bodies as well as Member State regulatory authorities to 
take decisions on public goods with potential effects on rights and legally protected in-
terests with very weak procedural and judicial controls.  
Those decisions can condition (whether enhancing or limiting) the rights and duties 
that citizens and legal persons enjoy on both sides of the Atlantic. They can define, or at 
least impact (whether raising or lowering), the level of protection that public goods (en-
vironment, health, financial stability, consumer protection) are subject to under domes-
tic regulation. It is hardly justifiable – unless one is willing to accept a regression of law 
in the name of executive expertise – that they can be adopted without suitable proce-
dural constraints that could structure the authority that executives exercise in the ex-
tensive areas of internationalised regulation, in an analogous way to those that apply 
domestically: i.e., to ensure both the objective legality of their actions and the subjective 
protection of those that they legally affect. The challenge is, of course, how to design 
those constraints in a way that preserves the ability of decision makers to pursue public 
interests that cannot be protected domestically, while ensuring that they are legally and 
politically accountable for their actions. 
 
